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Pr p sals and BEPS
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1

Introduction: The Current Mess
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There is a wide bipartisan consensus that the U.S. international tax regime is
broken. We have the highest corporate tax in the OECD, which at 35 percent
imposes a real burden on corporations earning mostly U.S.-sourcc income. At. the
same time, U.S.-based multinationals pay very low effective tax rates on foreignsource income earned through their subsidiaries, leading to a strong incentive
to shift profits out of the United States. Finally, the United States is among the
few countries to fully tax dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries to their domestic
parents, leading to the "trapped income" phenomenon in which $2 trillion of
low-taxed earnings of those subsidiaries cannot be repatriated because of the tax
on repatriations and have to be declared as "permanently reinvested" overseas
despite increasing difficulties to find something to do with this pile of money.
There is also a broad consensus about what needs to be done: reduce the corporate rate, broaden the base by taxing offshore profits and eliminate the tax on
repatriations, which affects behavior in negative ways without raising revenue.
President Obama's budget for fiscal 2016 docs all three, but in. a half-hearted w-ay
that does not fully address the problems and creates new ones.
The Ptesid¢,nt presumably believes that what he proposed is ju..~t a starting poie:t
for negotiations with congressional Republicans, and that it was the most he could
possibly expect to get, But it .iS not a good idea to begin negotiations by giving
away half of what you want. A famous Talmudic story tells of two brothers. who
argued over a piece of land. One said it was all his, while the 0th.er, wishing to
appear reasonable, said that each, should get ha!£ The judge held that since there
was no dispute over one half, the intransigent brother should get itj and then the
remaining half should be divided between them. A similar fate awaits Oba.ma's
proposals: Having conceded, for example, that the $2 trillion of trapped earnings should be ta:x:ed at 14 percent, or half the usual rate, he will be faced with
Republican demands for a s.even...percent rate.
There is, however, a better way. The G.20 .and OECD Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) project has established that our major trading partn.ers all want
to eliminate double nontaxation and that they ari;; willing to revise their controlled

foreign corporation (CFC) rules to do so, with specific
proposals due in September 2015. The President should
use this opportunity to convince the leaders of the G20 to
eliminate deferral or exemption of CFCs at their normal
corporate rate, which is always higher than 20 percent.
Such a multilateral solution deals with all the normal
objections to abolishing deferral unilaterally in the name
of competitiveness, neutrality or the need to prevent corporate expatriations. It will enable the United States to
achieve real corporate rate reduction and base broadening
without leaving in place the incentives to invert or to shift
profits overseas. And it will generate extra revenue that can
be used to reduce the top marginal individual tax rate, a
move that will please congressional Republicans and make
tax reform easier to swallow for the nonincorporared sector
of U.S. business.

The Obama Budget Proposals
The President's budget for fiscal 2016 contains three major
proposals to address the current mess. First, the President
proposes to reduce the corporate tax rate to 28 percent (25
percent for some domestic ma.nufacturing activity), while
raising the dividend and capital gains rate to 28 percent. 2
Second, the President proposes to impose a one-time transition tax of 14 percent (i.e., half the new normal rate) on
previously accumulated offshore earnings of U.S.-based
multinationals, and then let them repatriate those earnings without further tax:.3 Finally, the President proposes
to impose a per-country minimum tax of 19 percent on
the future earnings of CFCs of U.S. multinationals, and
thereafter let them repatriate those tax-free. 4' In addition,
the budget contains many previously proposed items,
including a reduction of the threshold to be treated as
an inverted company (and taxed as a U.S. corporation)
from 80 percent to 50 percent (or if the US corporation
.is bigger and continues to be managed from the United
States with no substantial. presence in the acquiring foreign
corpo.ration's country). 5
· Predictably, th€) proposals have been denounced by the
Business Roundtable ·as anti--competitive and by others
as a gh,eaway to the muldnationals. But congressional
Republicans have been. inore positive because these proposals are in fact quite similar to the tax reforms proposed
by former Ways and Means Chair Dave Camp (R-Mkh.) ·
last year, with the main difference being the rates. Camp
would have cut the overall rate to 25 percent, imposed a
3.5-8.75 ..percent tax on past earnings and taxed future
earnings at 12.5-15 percent. 6 1hus, it is quite possible.
that the two sides could compromise somewhere in the
middle between the two positions.
Ti
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Why the Obama Proposals
Are Inadequate
Neverthdess, in my opinion the Obama budget proposals arc
inadequate. They give away too mudi v.bile leaving the current perverse incentives in place, or even exacerbating some
of them. The following discusses these proposals in tntn.
First, the 14-percent tax on past earnings. There is no
policy justification for this rate in the budget, and it is hard
to think of one. Past earnings are by definition past1 and
therefore taxing them cannot affect either the competitiveness ofU.S. multinationals or their incentives. Not taxing
them in full is therefore a pure windfall that cannot be
defended in the name of either competitiveness or neutrality: Most logically, they should be taxed at the 35-percent
rate that would have applied when earned. I can at least see
logic in applying the full new 28 percent as an alternative.
Presumably, the reason to cut that rate in half is to assuage the opposition by the multinationals, who object to
any taxation of their offshore earnings because they have
not taken a reserve for such taxes (disingenuously declaring
them "permanently reinvested" overseas) and will therefore take a hit to their financials. But U.S. multinationals
have been earning record profits of late, and this kind
of "one-time hit" is something that capital markets will
understand. k such, U.S. multinationals can be expected
to bear this hit, having benefitted from decades of earning
income that belongs in the United States without paying
tax on it to any jurisdiction.
Second, the proposed 19-perccnt minimwn taX is actually lower than that because of an "allowance for corporate
equity" designed to accommodate multinationals with real
business operations in a given country. The result would be
that U.S. domestic earnings are taxed at 28 percent, or at
least 25 percent, while offshore earnings are taxed at less than
19 percent. Since there is no longer a tax on repatriations,
there will still be strong moti:vation to shift profits 1:roJ:ll the
United States to offshore CFCs wi:th no longer any c;:oncern
that the income will be trapped overse:as ..We,
after all,
talking about billions of dollars ~n tax, so that ~~nrper~ru;~
.age point translates into a huge savins ,for th~\m,uftinatiP~~.
On the su:rfru;e, 19 percent is higher th1µ1>the,.dfe~~¢:ra~t~ ·
imposed on foreign profits. by our major ~~m~tj~or ~~~ ··
tries, whi.ch generally e:1tempt active Joreigb ~co~~ :~het1
it is earned. and. when lt is repatriated. Howev¢r, tth the
existing CFC rules ofother countries, as well $Sithe expected
strengthenJng ofCFC regimes chat will rotrieoQt oftheBEP$
process; this 19 percent (~aually lowet than 19 perl::ett~ per
the above) wi:11 C<>mpetitiyely beeithef!• hettet ~i ,ypt:SCi,:th~ ·
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47, Dec. 15,550 (1947).
Emphasis added.
• 5 Gi',ienthatCode Sec. 267(a)(3}(B) merely defers
a deduction, rather than denying it permanently, it is generally believed that a corporatlon s
earnings and profits under Code Sec. 312 are
reduced by the deferred amount only when it is
recognized for purposes of calculating Income.
There is some confusion on this point, given
that Reg. §1.312-7(b)(1) states that losses disallowed under Code Sec. 267 reduce earnings and
profits currently. Given that the regulation was
last amended in 1972, it appears to be referring
to cases where section 267 permanently denies
a deduction. Since the regulation was issued,
Code Sec. 267(a)(2), Code Sec. 267(a)(3) and
Code Sec. 267(f) have been amended or added
to provide for temporary deferral, rather than
permanent denial of deductions.
•~ See, e.g., Reg.§ 1.1441-2(e)(1) ("A payment is
considered made to a beneficial owner if it is
paid in partial or complete satisfaction of the
beneficial owner's debt to a creditor").
•◄
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the tax rates applied to the earnings of
those c.ompetitor multinationals.7 The
winner or loser will be fully dependent
on factors such as industry, tax structures employed, home countries, etc.
Despite the noise thar U.S. multinationals will make about how they are
being hurt competitivdy, we should
ignore it as a red herring.
Irrespective of the red-herring
· nature of this competition issue, this
28-percent-19-percent structure will
violate the usual neutralities (CEN,
CIN and CON). Further, all the
noise aboµt competition issues may
result in a spate ofinvcrsions until the
new anti-inversion rule kicks in, in
December 2015. After that, we may
see an increase in actual takeovers of
U.S. multinational by larger foreign
muJtinationals, since even the President's anti-inversion proposal cannot
block those (and they can result in
larger job losses and emigration of
intellectual property than inversions,
since the new enterprise will actually
be headquartered abroad).
Finally, the new 28-percent
(or 25-percent) corporate rate is
MARCH-APRIL 2015

significantly below the top individual
rate (nominally 39.6 percent, but because ofthe restrictions on exempti.ons
and deductions, plus potentially the 3.8percem net investment income tax, it is
usually well over 40 percent, and with
state taxes it can be over 50 percent).
'The result will be a distinct bias in
favor of C corporations and against
businesses operating transparently as
S corporations, LLCs or partnerships
because even with higher taxes on dividends and capital gains, the fact thar
these taxes can be ddayed means that it
is frequently better to be a C corporation and pay 28 percent than to be a
passthrough and pay over 40 percent.
All of these biases will be exacerbated if, as expected, negotiations
with the Republicans further reduce
the minimwn rate on offshore income
bdow 19 percent and do not affect the
overall corporate rate much (the latter
cannot be further reduced without
eliminating other tax expenditures
that also benefit the unincorporated
sector, such as accelerated depreciation, which would make the bias in
favor of C corporations even worse).

BEPS: An Opportunity
for Real Reform
But there is a better way. The G20
all have corporate tax rates above 20
percent, and they all wish to eliminate double nontaxation of offshore
income, as evidenced by the actions
already adopted under BEPS.
By September, the BEPS project
is supposed to address changes in
the CFC rules to limit BEPS. 8 The
President has an opportunity to use the
BEPS project to achieve a c.oordinared
tax reform, in which all the G20 commit to taxing the offihore income of
their multinationals at their normal tax
rate, with no deferral or e:remption.9
Such an outcome achieves the best
of all possible worlds. First, because

most multinationals are based in the
G20, there will be no adverse impact
on competitiveness for any of them
because they all will be subject to
current tax at 20 percent or above
on both past and future earnings.
Second, we will simultaneously
achieve all the neutralities, since it
is well established that CEN, CIN
and CON can all be sarisfied at the
same time if rates are coordinated.
Third, there will be no barriers to
repatriating offshore funds. Finally,
there will be no incentive for taxmotivated takeovers or inversions
to G20 countries, although a tough
anti-inversion rule is still needed to
prevent moves outside the G20. I
would suggest a corporate-level exit
tax (deemed sale of assets), in addition to the President's proposal.
Would the Republicans ever agree
to anything like this? They might, if
there is a sweetener: using any excess
revenue to reduce the top individual
rate to be the same as the top corporate rate. If the rate structure returns
to where it was in 1986-1990, i.e.,
ordinary income, capital gains and
dividends taxed at 28 percent, plus a
28-percent corporate rare imposed on
worldwide income, all of the biases
discussed above (including the bias in
favor of C corporations and against
passthroughs) are largely eliminated.

Conclusion: The
Lessons of the FCPA
The basic conclusion from the U.S.
experience with tax reform is that in
a giobalized world, .it is hard to do tax
reform alone. 1here is no way to unilaterally address the biases in our system
without afrecting competitiveness.
There is a useful historical precedent
for the above proposal for multilateral
action. In 1977, the United States
adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which put U.S.
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